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ABSTRACT 
 
Why some bureaucracies are autonomous regarding personnel policies? New 
Political Economy approaches to public administrations tend to explain 
bureaucratic autonomy as a result of the political exchange between citizens (or 
interest groups) and rulers. The general prediction is that bureaucratic autonomy 
increases with the degree of diffusion of political power among different agents. 
Nevertheless, administrative history shows us that many political systems with 
very restricted interactions between citizens and rulers created highly 
autonomous bureaucracies. Using developments from organizational theory, this 
paper focuses on an interaction that one can observe in all polities: the 
relationship between rulers and public employees. The main hypothesis is that 
polities where powers are highly concentrated tend to develop more autonomous 
bureaucracies as a way to craft credible commitments towards public employees. 
Only when rulers are exclusively concerned about civil servants’ loyalty, systems 
with high diffusion of political power lead to highly autonomous bureaucracies. 
Empirical examples from contemporary developing countries and narratives 
from the historical development of bureaucracies in Europe illustrate these 
hypotheses. 
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1. The puzzle: Why in some public administrations the principal is not free to 
choose its agents? 
This paper aims to explain why the organization of some public administrations 
resembles the organization of private-sector hierarchies -that is, the “principal” 
(government) is free to choose its “agents” (public employees)- and, on the contrary, why 
some other public administrations have autonomous civil service systems which limit the 
capacity of the government for choosing public employees. This paper analyses what 
Frant sees as the “most striking” difference between private sector principals and many 
public sector ones: “civil service personnel systems, meaning personnel systems in which 
some important decisions about hiring, firing, and promotion are routinely made by an 
external commission that is not under the control of the chief executive” (1993: 990). 
Traditionally, Transaction-Cost Economics has focused on comparing markets 
with hierarchies. Their purpose has been to answer the Coasian question: “Why organize 
economic activity one way (e.g. procure from the market) rather than another (e.g. 
produce your own needs: hierarchy)?” (Williamson 1990: 80). Nevertheless, for 
Williamson (1999), the dichotomy market vs. hierarchy should be complemented by a 
third form: bureaucracy, which would be characterized by the existence of civil service 
systems. He considers that bureaucracy is a mechanism of economic exchange like 
hierarchy or market which is, such as these two, well-suited for some purposes and 
poorly suited for others. This paper moves the Coasian question from the dichotomy 
market vs. hierarchy to the dichotomy hierarchy vs. bureaucracy: Why organize activity 
in bureaucracies (with civil-service laws constraining principals) rather than in 
hierarchies (where principals are free to hire, fire and promote employees)? If Coase 
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(1937) asked the question Why Do Hierarchies Exist, given the fact that markets -
according to neoclassical economy- should work efficiently, the question this paper 
addresses is Why Do Bureaucracies Exist if hierarchies –according to basic incentive 
theory- should work efficiently.1  
Public administrations can be classified in a continuum that would go from the 
ideal-type hierarchy (i.e. governments-principals are totally free to hire, fire and promote 
the public employees-agents who work for them) to the ideal-type bureaucracy (i.e. 
governments-principals are totally limited in staff policy). In order to avoid a concept 
with so many connotations such as bureaucracy, the second extreme of the continuum 
will be defined in this paper as Bureaucratic Autonomy. In short, Bureaucratic Autonomy 
would be what Horn (1995: 101) defines as the “fundamental distinguishing 
characteristic” of independent civil service systems: that it “ties the hands” of rulers for 
managing civil servants. In other words, all kind of rulers need administrators; and rulers 
have two basic ways to organize this: first, to create a Corps of self-managed and self-
recruiting administrators (that we label Bureaucratic Autonomy) and, second, to employ 
administrators directly with a chain of responsibility that goes straight to the ruler (that 
we call Hierarchy). Between these two extremes we have a continuum of levels of 
discretion for the government. 
This paper proposes a simple and parsimonious theory, following an institutional 
or New Political Economy (NPE) approach, for explaining the location of real-world 
public administrations within that continuum. Traditionally, the study of bureaucracies 
has been monopolized by organizational theories that –through emphasizing so much the 
                                                 
1 For incentive theory, a principal’s discretion to choose its agents is essential to address two of the most 
prevailing organizational problems: adverse selection and moral hazard (for a summary of this approach, 
see Mas-Colell et al. 1995). 
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inherent complexities of bureaucracies and their cultural underpinnings- resist building 
testable theoretical propositions (Moe 1997: 455). As a result, studies of bureaucracy tend 
to be more descriptive than analytical and judgments tend to abound more than positive 
evaluations. For example, the German autonomous civil service system is frequently 
explained as a “guarantor of the public good” (Goetz 2000:87) and the French as a result 
of the “strong state tradition” (Meininger 2000: 189). Cultural explanations also face the 
problem of how to explain that such widely differing societies as Japan, France or 
Germany end up possessing similar civil service systems which, in turn, are different 
from those of the US, UK or Sweden (Silberman 1993: 8).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main NPE 
predictions on the effects of political institutions over the adoption of autonomous 
bureaucracies. Section 3 develops alternative institutional hypotheses based on insights 
from organizational economics. The hypotheses are derived from a double problem of 
trust in the relationships between politicians and public employees. First, there is a 
problem of positive control: politicians, like private-sector executives, must create 
incentives that inspire public employees to go beyond the required minimum levels of 
effort. Yet public employees do not trust politicians when the latter are too powerful and, 
therefore, they can renege on their promises. If concerned with this positive control, the 
more decisive (i.e. powerful) a ruler is, the more she will have to bureaucratise her 
administration –since autonomous bureaucracies may offer more credible promises to 
employees than all-powerful politicians. Second, there is a problem of negative control: 
politicians must prevent public employees from pursuing opposite interests to 
politicians’. Here, the relationship between politicians’ power and bureaucratisation 
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becomes the opposite: the less decisive a politician is, and thus the less capable of 
sanctioning employees he is, the more he will tend to “buy” public employees’ loyalty 
through bureaucratising the administration. In sum, the emergence of bureaucratic 
autonomy would be the result of different combinations between rulers’ survival 
strategies (i.e. to which type of control -positive or negative- rulers give more relative 
importance) and rulers’ levels of decisiveness. Section 4 offers some empirical 
illustrations of these hypotheses from contemporary developing countries and from the 
historical evolution of Modern Western European administrations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The NPE view: Diffusion of Powers increases Bureaucratic Autonomy 
NPE approaches to public administration tend to explain bureaucratic autonomy as a by-
product of the political exchange between citizens (or interest groups) and rulers –being 
something “inherent in our democratic system as a whole” (Moe 1989: 324).2 The 
autonomy of bureaucratic agencies is the result of the interactions between separated 
powers representing different interests (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, Huber and Shipan 
2001, Lewis 2003). In their review of delegation theories, Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 
(2001: 245) consider that one of the most established hypotheses within the literature is 
that the more principals, the more difficult is to control bureaucratic agents. Therefore, 
one should see more bureaucratic autonomy in those polities with diffusion of political 
authority among several actors than in those polities with concentration of powers in a 
single actor. Despite the bulk majority of NPE studies deals with policy autonomy, some 
few authors, such as Terry Moe, have also analyzed organizational autonomy –including, 
                                                 
2 Since this paper follows the NPE literature, for space reasons, the large amount of works outside the NPE 
tradition on this issue cannot be reviewed here. For an excellent review of those studies, see Hood and 
Lodge (2006). 
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like the focus of this paper, the management of personnel through politically independent 
civil service systems.    
For Moe (1989: 267), political uncertainty (i.e. legislators do not know if they will 
remain in incumbency for long) is the driving force behind the preferences of interest 
groups and legislators over the ideal type of bureaucracy. In order to protect the interest 
groups which support them, legislators will try to isolate agencies from an executive in 
hands of another party. On the contrary, “bureaucracy in parliamentary systems appears 
to be ‘less bureaucratic’ –less encumbered by formal restrictions, more informal and 
discretionary” (Moe 1990: 248). In parliamentary regimes it is more likely, due to the 
unchallenged authority of the party in government, that the administration resembles a 
coherent, top-down hierarchy. Horn (1995) and Williamson (1999) develop similar 
predictions. By removing party loyalists from the administration, and replacing them for 
‘untouchable’ bureaucrats, legislators prevent executives and future legislators (of 
opposing coalitions) from sabotaging the implementation of their policies.  
The main problem of NPE predictions on the impact of political factors over the 
design of civil service systems is their limited applicability outside the context of 
Western democracies –that is, how to explain that many bureaucratic reforms have taken 
place under autocratic regimes (e.g. 19th century Japan or 20th century Spain). The kind of 
open negotiation between legislators and their constituencies assumed by NPE authors 
seems difficult to conceive in dictatorships. Can we reasonably imagine a dictator 
granting autonomy to his civil servants in order to protect legislation from a future 
(maybe democratic) incumbent? This paper argues that the analysis of the interactions 
between rulers and civil servants -which one may find in both democratic and 
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authoritarian settings- may have more explanatory power than the NPE standard study of 
the exchanges between rulers and their electoral constituencies for understanding the 
arousal of autonomous bureaucracies. 
 
3. An Alternative Theory from Organizational Economics: Two Different Impacts 
of Diffusion of Powers over Bureaucratic Autonomy 
The theoretical starting point of this paper is the following trade-off pointed out by 
organizational economists for private firms: a principal with high concentration of 
powers is a more efficient producer of monitoring services, but it is incapable of credibly 
committing against opportunistic behaviour (Miller and Falaschetti 2001). If, according 
to organizational economists, “even the best organized firms confront the effects of this 
trade-off” (Besanko et al. 2000: 170), this paper contends that this trade-off may also be 
important for public sector organizations.  
Miller (1992) shows the pervasiveness of credible commitment problems within 
organizations using the following standard game of time inconsistency (figure 1). The 
employee moves first and has a choice of trusting the employer (working hard) or not 
trusting the employer (making a minimum effort). If the employee trusts the employer, 
the latter has the opportunity of honouring trust (giving a proper reward: e.g. paying $10 
per each piece the employee produces, granting a promotion, keeping the job in difficult 
times) or violating trust (not giving a proper reward: e.g. cutting the piece-rate to $5 once 
he realizes how many pieces the employee is able to make, cancelling a scheduled 
promotion, laying off employees in times of crisis).3 The employer may have incentives 
                                                 
3 The essence of the game is a problem of information asymmetry. Managers can never be sure how 
employees’ marginal cost of effort functions look like, and employees are systematically trying to protect 
  
8
8
to violate trust, because he obtains a direct benefit. Anticipating this violation, the 
employee refuses to trust the employer, which results in an outcome of minimum effort, a 
Pareto-suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. 
    [Figure 1 here] 
One obvious solution to this problem would be transforming the one-shot game 
into a repeated one. When there are expectations of frequent future interactions, actors 
must trade-off the short-run temptation of defection in the first round against the long-run 
cost in subsequent rounds. Following most organizational scholars on this issue, this 
paper focuses instead on one-shot games. Firstly, because many employees may 
effectively perceive most interactions as one-shot games –especially if managers’ 
violation of trust involves the possibility of dismissal. Secondly, because while repeated 
interaction between employers and employees might sustain a cooperative outcome, it 
can sustain other outcomes as well (Falaschetti 2002:  163). Nevertheless, and although 
the Folk theorem shows that there are no clear predictions as to the outcome of repeated 
games, future extensions of the games presented here should explore how equilibria 
change when we allow for repetition.  
Focusing on one-shot games, an explored way to mitigate organizational 
credibility problems is to introduce a system of diffusion of authority or “separation of 
powers” (Miller and Falaschetti 2001:403). If the owner of a firm (the one who obtains 
the benefits) is at the same time its manager (the one who fixes the price of $10 or $5 per 
each piece produced), workers may lack incentives to work hard because the owner has 
more temptations for opportunistic defections (such as adjusting piece-rates downward). 
                                                                                                                                                 
that informational advantage. But, if the employee trusts the manager and works hard, the latter discovers 
the employee’s real marginal cost of effort function (Falaschetti 2002: 163). 
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The historical success of the American corporation –where shareholders are “separated” 
from the day-to-day managers- could be ultimately explained by the virtues of diffusion 
of powers within organizations.  
Similarly, the interaction between governments and public employees could also 
be modelled by a two-person game such as the one depicted in figure 2. The most 
obvious difference from Miller’s trust game is that now the government (i.e. the 
employer) has the choice of playing the trust game –retaining his powers for hiring, 
firing, and promoting public employees (higher branch of the game tree)- or not playing 
it and tying its hands -granting Bureaucratic Autonomy (lower branch).  
    [Figure 2 here]  
Bureaucratic Autonomy gives predictability to actors’ payoffs. The assumption is 
that, instead of confronting relatively unpredictable rewards and incentives from 
governments, with Bureaucratic Autonomy public employees will deal with predictable 
rules on rewards and punishments —enforced by autonomous bodies such as 
administrative corps. There are also incentives with Bureaucratic Autonomy, but they are 
low-powered. For example, because in principle there are more subordinates than 
superiors in all organizations, there are almost always several candidates for any 
available promotion. The idea is that in a bureaucratised organization you must follow a 
more step-by-step promotion system, from one level to the one right above it.  
With Bureaucratic Autonomy, public employees will not be able to obtain the 
maximum payoff (A), because governments cannot offer them high-powered incentives 
(e.g. fast promotions); but, at the same time, it also prevents the worst outcome (e.g. 
opportunistic dismissal). As a result, Bureaucratic Autonomy would induce public 
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employees to exert what can be defined as a medium effort, halfway between the 
maximum and the minimum effort. At the same time, governments do not enjoy the 
benefits of a high-powered system of incentives when they decide to grant bureaucratic 
autonomy (they only obtain a medium effort), but they also avoid the worst payoff 
(minimum effort). Simultaneously, governments face a cost (-x) for using Bureaucratic 
Autonomy: they must pay employees for life, without a say in their management, and 
losing flexibility to respond to external shocks demanding for changes in the size and 
composition of the administration.  
Politicians’ delegation to autonomous bodies is never totally credible and rulers 
may overturn it. However, undoing Bureaucratic Autonomy is not cost-free for 
politicians, and actually one cannot see many de-bureaucratisation processes.4 
Bureaucratic autonomy thus simply plays the role that Falaschetti (2002:165) gives to 
hand-tying institutions: mechanisms that cannot totally eliminate principals’ moral hazard 
(i.e. governments will always be able to dismantle an autonomous administrative body), 
but that increase the costs of acting opportunistically (i.e. governments pay high costs for 
replacing an entire autonomous corps).  
To implement a given policy, the public employee can make a Maximum Effort 
(trust) or a Minimum Effort (mistrust). Maximum effort represents those efforts and 
asset-specific investments which may be subject to governments’ time-inconsistency 
problems. Like in Miller’s game, minimum effort would be here a level of effort 
                                                 
4 Even the most autocratic rulers who delegated personnel management to autonomous bodies, like Louis 
XIV in France or Franco in Spain, did not overturn these delegations. Nowadays, the entire New Public 
Management movement is an example of de-bureaucratization but, firstly, it is a recent phenomenon while 
this paper focuses on the historical emergence of autonomous bureaucracies; and, secondly and more 
importantly, as the literature has emphasized, NPM also entails important costs for politicians (for an 
extensive review of NPM see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).   
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sufficient for not being fired. If the public employee chooses minimum effort, the result is 
an inefficient outcome: both actors would be better off with other result (i.e. maximum 
effort/honour trust).  
The nature of the commitment problem in public organizations must also take into 
account that the decisiveness –using the terminology of Cox and McCubbins (2000)- or 
the capacity for taking a decision that changes the status quo –such as reneging on a 
promise- is limited in some polities. This limit is captured by the parameter d (diffusion 
of political authority or rulers’ constraints for taking decisions), which would be 0 in the 
most decisive regime one can imagine (e.g. extreme autocracy, where an unconstrained 
ruler concentrates all relevant policy decision-making); somewhat higher in one-party 
parliamentary governments, where, within the limits of the rule of law, “party’s supreme 
authority allows it to turn around tomorrow and renege on any agreement” (Moe 
1990:243); and much higher in multi-party parliamentary systems and presidential 
regimes, where the party in government needs to agree with coalition partners or other 
veto players in order to break a promise given to the employee. Despite the proliferation 
of cross-country indicators capturing the degrees of diffusion of political authority (e.g. 
number of relevant veto players, number of checks and balances) there is no consensus in 
the literature on the most adequate ones. Ultimately, following Tsebelis’ (2002) 
encompassing veto players theory, one must accept that, when embracing cross-country 
comparisons, this parameter d may also vary a lot depending on the policy at stake. 
Facing a government with low decisiveness, minimum effort gives the public 
employee a sure payoff of B while maximum effort represents the highest reward (A). 
When the constraints to decisiveness are high enough [d > (A – B)], as the public 
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employee makes a maximum effort, the government obtains a higher payoff by choosing 
Hierarchy (B) over Bureaucratic Autonomy (B – x). Conversely, with highly decisive 
governments [d < (A – B)], as the public employee makes a minimum effort, the 
government must balance the payoff C of Hierarchy against the payoff (B – x) of 
Bureaucratic Autonomy. That is, if the costs x are not high enough [x < (B – C)], the 
government will prefer Bureaucratic Autonomy when it is “too” decisive. 
With the Positive Control Game we have dealt with one of the political controls 
over public employees. Nonetheless, as argued previously, not only do politicians want 
an efficient personnel, but also a loyal one. Rulers’ survival in office may depend on 
inducing employees to do good actions (e.g. costly implementation efforts), but often 
times it also depends on preventing employees from doing bad actions (e.g. collaborating 
with the opposition or engaging in conspiracies and uprisings). In other words, one could 
also talk about the existence of a negative control in public organizations. 
The structure of the Negative Control Game (figure 3) is symmetrical to that of 
the Positive one. The only differences are the courses of action available to actors. 
Instead of a choice between minimum effort and maximum effort, here public employee 
decides between Shirk and Comply. Shirk collects all public employees’ actions that run 
against politicians’ interests -from undertaking a biased implementation (such as 
favouring some interest groups over others) to directly engaging in subversive actions. 
On the contrary, Comply means undertaking a loyal policy implementation. 
[Figure 3 here] 
If the public employee decides to shirk, the preferred option for the government is 
to Sanction. However, the capacity to detect and sanction a shirking activity is never 
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absolute and, again, it can also be seen as correlated with the level of decisiveness of a 
polity (i.e. parameter d). As has pointed out by NPE scholars, agents are more capable of 
shirking when they are facing two or more principals, because they can play off one 
principal against the other, and, at the same time, the more principals, the longer it takes 
to undertake a sanctioning decision (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990, Hammond and Knott 
1996).  
Like in the Positive Control Game, Bureaucratic Autonomy may be the solution 
available to politicians when they cannot solve the problem at stake on their own. Here, 
governments will opt for Bureaucratic Autonomy when they face many constraints to 
sanction public employees properly (i.e. high value of d). Similar to historical accounts 
on the emergence of independent administrations, bureaucratic autonomy may also be 
understood as a device to achieve public employees’ loyalty (Silberman 1993). Put 
simply, with bureaucratic autonomy (e.g. guaranteed life tenure, predictable promotions, 
and the like), the government “buys” public employees’ loyalty.  
Again, Bureaucratic Autonomy gives predictability to the actors’ payoffs and 
prevents the best and the worst outcomes for both players. It is a second-best option that 
is preferred when the first-best solution involves too many risks for the actors. If we look 
at the first node of the game tree we can see that when there is a low diffusion of powers 
[d < (B – C)], that is, when the government enjoys high decisiveness, as the public 
employee will comply, the government always obtains a higher payoff by choosing 
Hierarchy. When the diffusion of powers is a above a certain threshold [d > (B – C)], the 
public employee will have incentives to shirk. If the costs of Bureaucratic Autonomy are 
not very high [x < (B – C)], the politician will choose it. In sum, contrary to what 
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happened in the Positive Control Game, here we see an inverse relationship between 
government’s decisiveness and Bureaucratic Autonomy. 
Which interaction is more important for governments’ survival in office: the 
Negative or the Positive Control Game? That is, to prevent employees from shirking or to 
induce them to undertake higher levels of effort? Although the relative weight of 
organizational “efficiency” vis-à-vis “loyalty” varies for each office for each historical 
period and should be analysed on case-by-case basis, some theoretical developments may 
help establish some preliminary general distinctions across polities. For Bueno de 
Mesquita et al (2003), sometimes rulers have incentives to pursue good public policy 
(e.g. delivering public goods which make most people in a society better off) and 
sometimes bad public policy (e.g. repressive policies). That is, sometimes bad policy is 
good politics for rulers and good policy is bad politics. In order to survive in power, if 
rulers are facing riots or the threat of a civil war, they will tend to emphasize the loyalty 
of public employees over longer-term considerations like efficiency in policy 
implementation. On the contrary, if rulers are selected through fair and competitive 
elections, their survival in office may rely more on an efficient delivery of public 
policies.  
As Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) show, rulers’ survival strategy does not 
necessarily coincide with the regime type. Using the terminology of this paper, dictators 
do not always play the Negative Game and democratic rulers the Positive Game. Recent 
or instable democratic rulers, with a high future discount rate, may prefer to assure public 
employees’ loyalty rather than promoting the implementation of long-term public goods. 
At the same time, dictators with a relatively low future discount rate may give importance 
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to the delivery of public goods. Therefore, depending on the survival strategies of rulers 
(i.e. to which game rulers give more importance), four main hypotheses on the impact of 
the concentration/diffusion of powers over the level of Bureaucratic Autonomy can be 
drawn: 
     [Table 1 here] 
4. Empirical illustrations from developing countries and the history of European 
bureaucracies 
This section is aimed at providing a general map –both at contemporary and at historical 
level- of the relations between the independent variables (rulers’ decisiveness and rulers’ 
survival strategy) and the dependent one (level of bureaucratic autonomy). It offers some 
correlations and narratives of the mechanisms at play when certain rulers have tied their 
hands in the management of public employees, but a full contrast of the hypotheses is 
outside the scope of this paper, due to the lack of reliable comparative data on the 
characteristics of public bureaucracies.  
One of the few existing datasets would be Evans and Rauch’s (1999) Weberianess 
Scale, available for 35 developing countries, and which can be considered as a proxy for 
the degree of bureaucratic autonomy.5 Figures 4 and 5 plot the number of veto players6 
(proxy for the diffusion of powers in a polity) and the Weberianess scale for two different 
sets of countries: those which have experienced recent civil conflicts and those which 
                                                 
5 The Weberianness Scale is created from a country-experts survey gathered over the period 1993-1996. 
Most of the items included in the index relate to the degree of bureaucratic autonomy, such as the 
importance of exams (instead of political appointments) in recruiting civil servants or whether civil 
servants have secure tenure and are likely to stay in the civil service (instead of being dismissed by 
politicians). 
6 The number for each country is an average of the number of relevant veto players for the period 1970-
1990. For details on the data and the counting procedure for each country, see Beck et al. (2001). 
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have not.7 Civil wars are an obvious instance in which employees’ engagement with 
challengers may be more threatening for rulers (Silberman 1993). Therefore, it is 
plausible to assume a relatively major emphasis on the negative control of employees.8 
As hypotheses 3 and 4 predict, Figure 4 shows a positive relation between veto players 
and bureaucratic autonomy for those countries -despite being slight one.   
    [Figure 4 here] 
More importantly, narratives from qualitative accounts on bureaucracies in 
developing countries provide flesh-and-bone illustrations of this relationship. Case-
studies on the evolution of administrations in dictatorships subject to constant civil 
conflict and internal rebellions show how the most decisive rulers tend to grant the lowest 
levels of bureaucratic autonomy. Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire (1965-1997) epitomises the 
characteristics of an extremely decisive ruler for whom loyalty concerns became key to 
survive in power. Numerous studies detail Mobutu’s highly discretionary approach to 
staff policy. Individuals in public office were totally dependent on him for selection and 
were persistently reminded of the precariousness of tenure (Acemoglu et al. 2004:7-10). 
Furthermore, by regularly rotating government posts, Mobutu managed to maintain 
constant uncertainty and vulnerability (Leslie 1987:70). More generally, administrative 
literature on post-colonial Africa considers that the great politicization we see in many 
state apparatuses obeys to the survival strategy of rulers –obsessed with the loyalty of 
public officials (Guy Peters 1995).9 
                                                 
7 The countries in figure 4 have experienced some civil conflict in the period 1960-1990. Data from 
Alvarez et al.’s (1997) ACLP World Political/Economic Database.  
8There are many other instances, apart from civil wars, where servants’ loyalty can be key for rulers. The 
impossibility of obtaining data for those circumstances limits the scope of this empirical analysis, and its 
possible inferences must only be done for the concrete loyalty problems caused by civil wars.  
9As one former ruler of Ghana admitted in relation to the design of his highly politicized administration, 
“for disloyal servants are no better than saboteurs” (quoted in Guy Peters 1995:209). 
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On the contrary, literature documenting administrative reforms by non-decisive 
rulers subject to continuous threats of rebellion or civil confrontation points out how they, 
unlike their decisive counterparts, prefer granting bureaucratic autonomy rather than 
increasing their levels of discretion to assure civil servants’ loyalty. Silberman (1993) 
shows how in contexts of high political uncertainty -such as France, Spain or Japan at the 
turn of the 20th century- weak and limited rulers resorted to “buy” public employees’ 
loyalty with increasing levels of autonomy. For instance, in the aftermath of the Russian 
revolution, many Spanish public employees actively engaged in the revolutionary riots 
which endangered the fragile parliamentary democracy. In response to the strikes in the 
postal service, the Home Minister used his discretionary power in personal staff to 
replace post workers for more-loyal military officers. However, the government was a 
coalition of diverse parties (i.e. high diffusion of powers) and the rest of the ministers 
ended up vetoing his decision. Unable to properly sanction employees, Prime Minister 
Maura chose a second-best option: granting bureaucratic autonomy through the 
enactment of the 1918 Civil Service Act. Administrative historians agree that this Act 
was not aimed at providing the right incentives to implement better public policies, but at 
calming down public employees under uncertain and proto-revolutionary circumstances 
(Nieto 1976:315; Parrado 2000:253). 
If we look instead at those countries without recent civil wars –that is, countries in 
which one may assume a relatively higher weight of the positive control- the impact of 
decisiveness over bureaucratic autonomy seems to be the opposite. As hypotheses 1 and 2 
predict, we can see in Figure 5 how polities with more concentration of powers are the 
ones with more bureaucratic autonomy. The notable expansion of autonomous 
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bureaucracies under the rule of “developmentalist” dictators -such as Spain’s Franco, 
Chile’s Pinochet or some East Asian countries- could be an example of how highly 
unconstrained rulers interested in providing incentives to public employees need 
bureaucratic autonomy to overcome organizational credibility problems.10  
    [Figure 5 here] 
Along those lines, there is an overwhelming consensus among administrative 
scholars on the important increase in bureaucratic autonomy under the rule of one of the 
longest serving dictators of the 20th century –Spain’s Franco (1936-1975). Especially 
since the late 1950s onwards, when Franco regime entered his “developmentalist” phase, 
Spanish administrative bodies became more independent than their European 
counterparts in democratic systems –including the traditionally highly autonomous 
French corps (Beltrán 2001:609).11 As a result, the last two decades of Franco’s rule are 
considered as one of the closest to the “bureaucratic ideal” in the history of Western 
Europe (Nieto 1976:574).12  
The literature also reveals that the mechanisms at play when Franco tied his hands 
–and his ministers’- for managing public employees were similar to those pointed out in 
the positive control game. Franco offered high levels of bureaucratic autonomy very 
particularly to those public employees -and would-be public employees- who had to 
undertake costly asset-specific investments in human capital, such as state lawyers and 
civil engineers. Franco gave more autonomy precisely to those who could suffer the most 
                                                 
10 See Preworski and Limongi 1993 for an account of the reasons why some dictators become 
“developmentalist” and how they need an efficient administration. 
11 Among other differences, for example, the Spanish corps enjoyed self-financing capacities. 
12 For Parrado (2000), the Franco’s state could basically be defined as a bureaucratic state. According to 
Villoria (1999:103), it could be argued that the Weberian prophecy was fulfilled completely during the last 
years of Franco’s rule. 
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an all-powerful ruler’s time inconsistency problems. Granting bureaucratic autonomy was 
the only way to achieve Corps’ collaboration for the implementation of Franco’s 
ambitious public infrastructure plans (Nieto 1976:254). As high-ranking civil servants of 
the time admitted, credibility concerns were playing a key role in Franco’s administrative 
reforms: “corps’s appropriation of the administrative organization has been the only 
possible guarantee against the excessive arbitrariness of political managers”; because, “in 
their relations with the Government, Corps try to absorb the decisions that affect their 
members, protecting them from the ‘danger’ of politicians’ discretion” and “guaranteeing 
more satisfactory working conditions” (De la Oliva and Gutiérrez Reñón 1968:63). 
Few inferences may be extracted from this limited number of observations, but a 
look into the qualitative literature on the historical emergence of bureaucracies in Modern 
Europe under different political regimes seems to confirm these patterns and also 
provides insights into the mechanisms underlying rulers’ decisions. To begin with, there 
are arguments to sustain that Early Modern European monarchs (particularly, in Britain, 
France, Spain, Prussia and Sweden)13 were increasingly interested in playing the Positive 
Control Game –at least with certain public employees. For example, in comparison to 
contemporary post-colonial African “predatory” states, Bates (2001:102) concludes that 
Early Modern European rulers tended to provide public goods and wealth-enhancing 
policies (e.g. public infrastructures) because, unlike the former, they did not receive 
foreign aid, and thus their ability to survive politically and fund their wars depended to a 
greater extent upon the capacity of their subjects to produce economically, and thus 
generate the basis for tax revenues. 
                                                 
13 That is, the ones for which there are some historical comparative administrative studies available. 
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Despite sharing similar survival strategies, Modern European countries exhibit 
different levels of concentration of powers. Scholars classify them in two main groups: 
Absolute Monarchies –like France, Spain or Prussia- and Limited Monarchies –such as 
Britain, Holland or Sweden (Finer 1997). Likewise, Acemoglu et al. (2004:24) develop 
the variable ‘Constraints on the Executive’, which measures limitations on the arbitrary 
use of power by the executive. In other words, it compares European Monarchs’ level of 
decisiveness historically. Table 2 offers the values of this variable (which ranges from 1 
to 7) for the five countries from 1500 to 1750. One may observe how while the starting 
position was similar in 1500 (with highly decisive rulers), there are two divergent paths 
since then. While in France, Spain and Prussia rulers’ decisiveness either remained very 
high, both Sweden and (very particularly) Britain increased their constraints on the 
executive. 
     [Table 2 here] 
According to hypotheses 1 and 2, one should see more bureaucratic autonomy in 
Absolute Monarchies than in Limited ones. What it is argued here would thus be similar 
to McLean’s comparison, following North and Weingast (1989), between Modern France 
and Britain: “French rulers from Louis XIV to XVI could never make a credible promise 
not to renege on their debts. But the British executive (…) would not be able to renege 
because parliament (…) could have punished the executive for any default. This was 
common knowledge, and so Britain faced a lower interest rate on its state debt than 
France” (2000:668). If one reviews the existing literature on the differences between 
administrative structures in Modern Europe, it seems that the French –together with the 
Prussian and Spanish- kings had to pay as well what can be considered as a higher 
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interest rate to state employees than their British –or Swedish- counterparts. While the 
later relied on flexible administrative structures closer to private-sector hierarchies, the 
former delegated personnel policies to highly autonomous and independent bureaucratic 
corps.   
    [Table 3 here] 
Regarding Britain, there is a wide consensus in the literature that in its state-
building Britain did not develop an autonomous civil service (Cohen 1941, Fischer and 
Lundgreen 1975). The British executive enjoyed a substantial discretion for selecting, 
promoting, firing and establishing incentives for state employees. As a result, the non-
formalized system of hiring and firing in the Early Modern Britain looked like that of 
private-sector corporations (Finer 1997). This was a perfect setting for recruitment by 
patronage, but it did not necessarily mean ineffectiveness. A person in the hierarchy of 
service who wanted to go ahead or stay at least, was well advised to look for capable 
assistants (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975:490). Consequently, the Early Modern Britain’s 
administrative system could be defined as a system of “hunting” and protection of talent, 
which “remained in a much more fluid, adaptable state than on the Continent” (Fischer 
and Lundgreen 1975:483). Similar to what the Positive Control Game would predict, 
British governments seemed able to obtain the maximum level of effort from their 
employees without the need of granting them bureaucratic autonomy. Although there is a 
lack of conclusive evidence in this point, scholars point out the “paradox” that, despite 
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having an administration made of “amateurs” –in contrast to the more autonomous 
French “professionals”- the British state appeared quite efficient.14  
Equally, the few existing comparative studies which include the historical 
evolution of the Swedish public administration underline its similarities with the British 
one. For instance, Guy Peters (1995) remarks that, historically, the Swedish 
administration has been much more accountable to rulers than their Prussian or French 
equivalents, because Sweden lacked the independent administrative bodies the latter had 
developed. For example, like in Britain, and unlike in France or Spain, Swedish civil 
servants had no proprietary claim to their offices (Ertman 1997).  
 In relation to the French administration, the scholarship agrees that it was 
precisely in times of the all-powerful Sun-King Louis XIV –that is, when ruler’s 
decisiveness was especially high- when the main characteristics of the French 
administrative state –and in particular the autonomy of the Grand Corps- took shape 
(Guy Peters 1995). State employees started to enjoy a high degree of isolation from 
monarchs’ -and his cabinets’- interferences thanks to their integration in increasingly 
autonomous administrative bodies. Particularly in finance and law, the classical branches 
of inner administration, civil servants were grouped into types of officiers, ruled by cours 
souveraines which never acquiesced to consider themselves dependent on the king and 
his conseil d’état.    
The first autonomous corps within the French army entailed the two main types of 
specialists required at the time: the genie-officer (i.e. military engineer) and the artillerist 
(Fischer and Lundgreen 1975:550). These specialists –who had to undertake costly asset-
                                                 
14 Fischer and Lundgreen (1975:490) analyze, among others, the good results obtained by the flexible 
British and Dutch Navies when compared with the more bureaucratized ones of Portugal and Spain, which, 
nevertheless, had started the 16th century with a maritime position of superiority. 
  
23
23
specific investments in human capital- were divided in independent self-regulated bodies 
(e.g. the corps du genie militaire, 1697) and selected via autonomous military technical 
colleges (e.g. the école du genie, 1748). That was also the case for the civil 
administration, where here again France was the pioneer creating autonomous bodies for 
the most sophisticated technical services -and of crucial importance to the modernizing 
French state- such as civil engineering and architecture (e.g. corps des ponts et chausses, 
1716).            
With regards to Prussia, in times of the Great Elector Frederick William (1640-
1688), the army was organized through contracts –called Kapitulation- between the 
Elector and Colonels. However, Frederick William, taking advantage of his 
unconstrained decisiveness, started to modify ad hoc those contracts and veto some 
colonels’ appointments in the army -what produced discontent among troops. As a result, 
his successor, Frederick William I, decided to replace the Kapitulation contracts for a 
bureaucratic-like army, giving a regular employment to soldiers as well as high rates of 
pay (Finer 1997). Soon afterwards, several delegations of staff policy “made the officers’ 
corps relatively independent of government interference” (Fischer and Lundgreen 
1975:524). For instance, once a candidate had passed all examinations, he had to be 
elected by the officers of the corps he wanted to join.  
Regarding civil service, Prussia is considered as the first country in Modern 
European history to have elaborated and applied a merit system (Fischer and Lundgreen 
1975:516). Almost immediately, the rules of recruitment became very strict and were not 
broken up by arbitrary exceptions from the government (Finer 1932:119; Morstein Marx 
1957:174). There was also an increase in the number of regulations which protected 
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functionaries from being arbitrarily fired by the executive. In the same way, a sentence of 
the Reichskammergericht in 1759 stated, for the first time in Modern Europe, that the 
removal of a civil servant could not be decided by the executive, but by a well-founded 
judicial sentence (Nieto 1976:46). In general, it was under the reign of four successive 
Hohenzollern kings (1640-1786) -one of the European dynasties traditionally known for 
their capacity to concentrate powers- when Prussia developed its high levels of 
bureaucratic autonomy.  
Similar to Prussia, the Spanish Absolutist monarchy started to lose its capacity to 
freely remove civil servants during the 17th century. In the first place, monarchs designed 
more complex appointment contracts which offered civil servants guarantees against 
arbitrary removals (Trayter 1992:38). A functionary could only be dismissed ex grave 
and legitima causa and through an increasingly detailed procedure. In sharp contrast to 
the British administration, several observers of the time noticed that in Spain an 
executive-dominated personnel system was being increasingly replaced for a judiciary 
one. For example, Castillo de Bobadilla (1546-1605) remarked that “no one can be 
deprived of his office unless it is by a great reason or in the cases issued by laws”15 and 
Fernández de Otero stated in 1732 that “officials cannot be removed unless there is a fair 
cause”.16  
At the same time, the Spanish administration gradually adopted a structure of 
independent corps similar to the French and Prussian ones. Again, it was precisely during 
the 18th-century ‘enlightened despotism’ of King Charles III –that is, when the 
traditionally high decisiveness of Bourbon monarchs coexisted with the will to provide 
                                                 
15 Politica de Corregidores, 1775, Ed. Madrid, p.239. Quoted in Nieto (1976:46).  
16 Tractatus de Officialibus Reipublicae, 1750, p:62-63. Quoted in Nieto (1976:50). 
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extensive public goods, and, therefore, when one could expect the Positive Control Game 
to become more relevant- when the most prestigious corps of engineers were established 
(e.g. Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros, 1774).  
In sum, the available evidence indicates that, first, the most unconstrained and 
powerful rulers in Modern Europe according to standard accounts (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 
2004) were precisely the ones who tied the most their hands for managing public 
employees. Secondly, very similar to what is argued in section 3, the existing evidence 
also points out that those authoritarian rulers tied their hands in order to increase the 
overall levels of administrative efficiency –in most of the cases, to provide public goods 
that would allow rulers to raise more taxes to fund their colonial and war enterprises.  
 
5. Conclusions 
On the one hand, neither the limited and eclectic analysis of contemporary 
developing countries nor the narratives from the different administrative paths of Modern 
European countries fully contrast the theoretical hypotheses depicted in Section 3. On the 
other hand, the empirical eclecticism –so frequent in comparative administration studies 
due to the almost total absence of cross-country datasets- has the advantage of 
corroborating from multiple sources of evidence (Brans 2003:426). And, more 
importantly, despite being few and extremely heterogeneous, the empirical examples 
shown here are far from trivial and some of them are both counter-intuitive and at odds 
with mainstream NPE authors. Bureaucratic autonomy is normally seen by NPE as a 
consequence of the democratic game –frequently, as an inevitable cost of having 
separation of powers- and, in general, as the result of interactions between rulers and their 
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constituencies. Using developments from organizational theory, this paper contends that 
the relevant exchange for understanding bureaucratic autonomy is the one between rulers 
and state employees. 
The main contribution of this paper is theoretical. Traditionally, Transaction-Cost 
Economics (TCE) has assumed that “in the beginning, so to speak, there were markets” 
(Williamson 1981:1547). From there, TCE has basically tried to understand the shift from 
markets to hierarchies. This paper moves the initial assumption a step forward, assuming 
that, in the beginning, so to speak, states were organized as hierarchies. And it tries to 
understand why some polities have remained closer to the hierarchical ideal while others 
have switched toward the bureaucratic one. 
The simple theory drafted here brings together two different ideas on 
organizational design and applies them to public administrations. First, it has been shown 
that, when mostly concerned with policy efficiency, rulers with high decisiveness will 
tend to delegate staff policy to autonomous administrative bodies as a way to craft 
credible commitment towards employees. This finding concurs with the insights by some 
economists like Granovetter (1985:487) or Williamson (1994:97), who argue that to 
create credible commitments (through the use of bonds, hostages, information disclosure 
rules, specialized dispute settlement mechanisms, and the like; in this case, bureaucratic 
autonomy) is to produce functional substitutes for trust. Second, this paper exposes, in 
accordance with the insights by some political scientists (Silberman 1993), that, when 
mostly concerned about public employees’ loyalty, rulers with low decisiveness will tend 
to grant bureaucratic autonomy to civil servants as a way to buy their loyalty. 
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This paper sheds some light on the question of which political systems produce 
more ‘bureaucratic’ administrations. The focus is on the emergence, not on the continuity 
of bureaucratic autonomy, which may depend on different factors. Likewise, this paper 
does not control for alternative hypotheses which could also have a say in the 
development of public administrations. It seems reasonable to think that many different 
factors may have had a say in the arousal of each specific autonomous bureaucracy in 
each country and at each particular historical period. This paper simply tests the impact 
of some particular political variables –for which there is some evidence pointing out the 
mechanisms through which they act- over the type of public administration.  
In that sense, it has provided evidence which, to say the least, questions one of the 
main statements by NPE approaches to public administrations: that the more divided the 
government is, the more autonomous and insulated its civil servants will be (Moe 1990, 
Moe and Caldwell 1994, Horn 1995, Lewis 2003). A recurrent argument within this 
literature has been to blame the American system of separation of powers for what they 
see as an excessive degree of bureaucratic autonomy. The normative statement which 
would follow from their insight is thus very clear: a system with more concentration of 
powers solves the problems of bureaucratic autonomy. In words of Lewis, “it reinforces 
our belief in a strong and independent executive who brings about both a unique 
perspective and formidable powers to negotiation over the design of the administrative 
state” (2003:18). On the contrary, the normative statement of this paper would be almost 
exactly the opposite (for many or most polities):17 formidable powers may end up 
                                                 
17 For all those polities, like the US, in which one may reasonably assume that rulers are interested in the 
provision of public policies to survive in power. 
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producing formidable problems of credibility. And to resolve them, more bureaucratic 
autonomy will be required.  
In sum, it is a common place in the Political Economy literature to point out the 
existence of the following trade-off: the more you protect the people (i.e. through 
diffusing political authority among several principals or veto players), the more you 
disable the government to act because governments become less decisive (Przeworski 
1996, Tsebelis 2002). As it has been shown here, the decisiveness of a government may 
be essential to control public employees (to prevent them from shirking), yet 
government’s decisiveness may not be an asset but a liability for enabling the 
administration to work due to the inherent problem of trust within all organizations. As a 
matter of fact, when rulers are interested in providing public policies, one may arrive to 
opposite conclusions to those prevailing among many political economists: the more you 
protect people from government, the more you enable the government to act, because less 
decisive governments are more credible regarding public bureaucrats, and costly 
bureaucratic autonomy arrangements are not so necessary. 
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Table 1. Hypotheses from the Positive and Negative Control Games 
 
 Concentration of Powers: 
Government with High 
Decisiveness 
Diffusion of Powers:  
Government with Low 
Decisiveness 
 
Survival strategy of rulers 
primarily depends on public 
employee’s Loyalty 
(Government and civil 
servants play the Negative 
Control Game) 
 
LOW BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY 
(Hypothesis 4) 
 
 
 
HIGH BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY 
(Hypothesis 3) 
 
 
Survival strategy of rulers 
primarily depends on the 
efficient provision of public 
goods  
(Government and civil 
servants play the Positive 
Control Game) 
 
HIGH BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY 
(Hypothesis 1) 
 
 
LOW BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY 
(Hypothesis 2) 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Table 2. ‘Constraints on the Executive’ in Early Modern European countries 
 
 France Prussia Spain England Sweden 
1500 2 
 
1 1 2 2 
1600 1 
 
1 1 3 2 
1700 1 
 
1 1 5 3 
1750 1 
 
1 1 6 3 
    Source: Acemoglu et al. (2004) 
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Table 3. Early Modern European countries according to their type of administration and 
political decisiveness 
 
 
 
Figure 1.– The Commitment Problem in firms  
 
Employer’s outcome ranking A > B > C. Employee’s outcome ranking 
A > B > C. Figure adapted from Miller (1992).  
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(Acemoglu et al. 2004) 
  
Britain 
Sweden 
 
Violate Trust
Employer 
Honour TrustEMPLOYEE
Trust 
Mistrust
Employee
EMPLOYER
C
A B
B C
A
  
35
35
 
Figure 2.– The Positive Control Game  
 
Public Employee’s outcome ranking A>B>C. Governments’ outcome ranking A>B>C.  
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Figure 3.– The Negative Control Game  
 
Public Employee’s outcome ranking A>B>C. Governments’ outcome ranking 
A>B>C.  
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Figure 4 
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